Read part one here.
Again, a quick survey of examples. Why do we care about what “came first,” that is, about the origins of the Universe? We need only look at the debate between science and religion, i.e., Evolutionism and Creationism. When we look at the debate “objectively,” as a disagreement between two intellectual positions, we are at a loss as to why it is so vitriolic and decisive for many. From a relativistic point of view, why should it matter whether one person believes the Universe has no creator and came to be out of chance while another maintains that a divine Creator fashioned the world ex nihilo? Why do theists denounce atheistic scientific (no, this is not redundant; plenty of scientists have been theistic) explanations for being incomplete and dogmatic, and why do atheist scientists expend so much energy trying to disprove what they see as pure irrationality that is just as, if not more, dogmatic? Are they not differing worldviews?
Matter of factly, they are “just” worldviews. Yet we miss the fact that, as we have seen, beginnings and ends are often linked together; what is first can be (but is not always) final. What is first is determinative, though not, to be clear, necessarily deterministic. The beginning, as what is prior, may have priority. In sprinting, the athlete with the best start is not guaranteed to win in the 100 meter dash; however, a good start is nonetheless immensely useful and may, in the end, prove to have been most decisive. (With the 60 meter dash, we see a similar story: the margins of error are even more pronounced, a sprinter’s start proving even more decisive, but still not total.)
Therefore, the disagreement between the creationist and the evolutionist is not simply about how human life came to be in itself, which is inconsequential, but more importantly about what is implied therein/-by. For the Christian, the end, salvation, derives its significance from the beginning. Whether we are originally sinful, as Augustine, Luther, and Calvin insisted, creates a whole host of consequences, all of which are essential to a Christian way of life. Whether or not we are descended from primates (note the root: prima: first!)—not monkeys, as the caricature goes—without a transcendent deity who assigned us a destiny or purpose, and whether we rose to dominance by chance mutations, gives us an entirely different world. The scientific worldview is highly consistent, so the idea of a special, privileged organism being selected, let alone created, above all others, is an absurdity; everything is traceable within its respective place in nature. It is not the case, then, that beginnings are “just beginnings,” without any value. Firstness is often prescriptive.
Take another example, that of the “primitive.” What are we to make of, say, European artists—to name a few, Pablo Picasso, Henri Rousseau, and Paul Gauguin—who, in the the late 19th– and early 20th-centuries, roughly the French Belle Époque, dabbled in African and Polynesian art, which they saw as simple, pure, innocent, and childlike—in a word, “primitive”? The Palais du Trocadéro, which housed the Musée d’Ethnographie, and whose existence was made possibly by French expeditions in Africa, South America, and Polynesia, inspired Picasso’s famous 1907 work Les Demoiselles d’Avignon; and the Gauguin painting that I mentioned earlier, “Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going?” also has its inspiration from this same fetishized thinking.
It stems in part from the writings of the semi-Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who idealized the trope of the “Noble Savage,” and who, in his two discourses—the first, “On the Arts and Sciences” (1750), and the second, “On the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men” (1754)—denounced the decadence of European modernity and bemoaned the simplicity of our pre-agricultural origins, when we were self-sufficient and had fewer problems, most of today’s being, in his diagnosis, trivial and artificial. Rousseau, of course, never traveled to North America, whose “savage” peoples he nonetheless romanticized and promoted as being superior to us, morally and spiritually.
This seems like an odd position, given that we are more likely to think of the many Europeans who, in Africa, justified oppression and genocide precisely on the same ground, namely, that the Africans were “primitive.” So how could Rousseau and Modernist painters see primitivism as something to emulate and aspire to, while others took the opposite view, interpreting it as something to be eradicated, civilized, and assimilated? I think it has to do with the very label, “primitive,” since it refers to being first. But first in which sense? As that which is chronologically first, or that which is normatively first? For the imperialists, who drew on social Darwinian evolutionary theory and scientific racism, Africans were less mature and developed; they were “primitive” because they were the closest to the origins of humanity, and therefore not as complex, and in need, conveniently, of white saviors who bore the “burden” of civilizing.
Contrariwise, Rousseau, seeing—or rather, reading—that North American natives were living simply, concluded that we had strayed too far from our beginnings. In moving away from nature, in building cities, in developing culture, etc., we have become alienated from ourselves, from who we “really are,” which is what the so-called “Noble Savage” represented for Rousseau. Therefore, modernity is something that is “late,” something “fallen.” Here, “firstness” is both temporal and valuable, whereas in the case of the imperialists, it was only the former. What is earlier, or first, is better or worse than what succeeds it in simplicity, simplicity being either positive or negative and inextricably tied up with primacy.
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings in Ancient Greece, the question of what is most fundamental, that which comes first (and/or ought to come first), the arche (αρχή), was determinative. Of what was philosophy ultimately the study? Where was philosophy to begin? In the Metaphysics, Aristotle takes “ontology,” the study of being, to be what he calls “first philosophy.” By this, he meant that because existence is the most universal thing, it is the most fertile for philosophical thinking. To think about a thing, that thing must first exist, and furthermore, we ourselves must first exist in order to think about the existent thing. As such, the concept “Being” is the broadest, as it encompasses everything.
Many centuries later, in 1641, a French philosopher, René Descartes, published an influential book titled Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, that is, Meditations on the First Philosophy. Prima philosophia, first philosophy, was no longer ontology; instead of investigating reality, Descartes investigated how we knew, or could know, reality. Epistemology, the study of knowledge, was now first philosophy. After the 17th-century, as a result of Descartes’ famous declaration, “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum), philosophy became a matter of ensuring certain knowledge.
This would culminate in the 1781 publication of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which, in beginning the tradition of German Idealism, established the foundations and limitations of human thinking. Most importantly for us here, Kant initiated the project of “transcendental philosophy.” Transcendentalism, in Kant’s formulation, is the study of “the conditions of possibility of experience,” or of a priori cognition.[1] Transcendental reason seeks the structures and means by which we can understand anything from the outset. As a rough example, consider vision: In order to see, there must be light; in order for light to enable vision, we must have eyes; in order for eyes to see in the light, we must first possess the capacity to see—in short, visibility per se.
About 200 years later, the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, writing in the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust, forcefully denied that either ontology or epistemology was philosophy’s foremost inquiry: “Morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy.”[2] How we interact with and treat our fellow human beings takes precedence over what the world is or how we come to know it. For Levinas, the abstract preoccupation with the nature of being and the conditions of certainty, which were definitive for Western philosophy, were a major cause for the brutality of the 20th-century; by beginning with speculative/theoretical knowledge, rather than the immediate experience we have with our neighbors, we ended up overlooking humanity, becoming blind to each other, subordinating ethical conduct to capital “t” “Truth.”
I want to specifically look at a movement/method that started in the 20th-century, namely, phenomenology, and how, descending from the Kantian tradition, it operates as a form of transcendentalism. Roughly defined, phenomenology is the study of lived, conscious experience. Edmund Husserl, who formalized the method, refers to his thinking in the Cartesian Meditations (an explicit allusion to Descartes) as “transcendental phenomenology,” because he wants to trace all of our experiences to their roots, to what makes them possible, which he calls “reduction.” Closer to our time is the phenomenologist Michel Henry, who passed away in 2002. In one of his early works, he discusses how phenomenology provides us with “primordial knowledge,”[3] whose “study is comprised within the project of a first philosophy.”[4]
Hence, the discourse surrounding prima philosophia is not dead yet. If the connection is not clear enough, then Henry continues thus: “Is not ‘primitive’ that which makes something possible?”[5] Having briefly analyzed the word and concept “primitive,” we now have a direct application of it within phenomenology itself, where it clearly denotes that which, being the simplest and most “natural,” so to speak, “makes something possible”; it is, in other words, the launch pad for all knowledge, the most fundamental science—precisely what Descartes, and after him Husserl, were after. Primitive/primordial knowledge, which is what phenomenology is supposed to articulate, lies at the bottom of experience and forms its basis.
For a more detailed demonstration of this, we can look to one of the greatest (and most controversial) phenomenologists: Martin Heidegger. His book Being and Time (1927) is the foundational text for existential phenomenology, and it inspired the philosophy of the Existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, from whom Heidegger would dissociate himself. Very early in the book, Heidegger introduces the technical phrase “zunächst und zumeist,” which I have seen translated as either “proximally and for the most part” or “first and foremost.”[6] The word that interests us here is “zünachst,” which, as the translators explain, comes from “nächst,” meaning “that which is closest,” both physically and emotionally. “Heidegger,” they say, “often uses ‘zünachst’ in the sense of ‘most closely,’ when he is describing the most ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’ experiences which we have at an uncritical and pre-philosophical level.”[7] Our day-to-day lives are lived in an unreflective manner. We go about our lives in a smooth, uniform way “first and foremost.” This phrasing captures the intimacy which we have with our existence.
To make this concrete, here is an example: proximally and for the most part, we live our lives in the future, because we are always moving forward, making plans ahead of time, scheduling events in the far and near future; throughout the day, we think ahead to dinnertime and what we will eat, to deadlines that we have to meet, to who we will see in the afternoon, to what generally needs to get done, etc. Our concern for the future is at the forefront of our minds, so we might say that it is not only “first” but also “foremost”! It often takes precedence over the present and past, like when, in the middle of doing homework, I suddenly lose myself thinking about something which will be happening over the weekend and which I am literally looking forward to. Consequently, much of our life is spent, proximally and for the most part, looking forward to things.
However, things get complicated when Heidegger looks at the significance of our existence.
[1] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A11/B25, p. 133
[2] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 304
[3] Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, p. 5
[4] Id., p. 54
[5] Id., p. 175
[6] Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 37/H.16 (Citations with “H.” refer to the German pagination)
[7] Id., p. 25n2/H.6
Works referenced:
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward S Robinson, Harper, 1962.
Henry, Michel. Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body. Translated by Girard J Etzkorn, Nijhoff, 1975.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Levinas, Emmanuel, and Alphonso Lingis. Totality and Infinity: An Essays on Exteriority. Duquesne Uiversity Press, 2003.